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This research was conducted to examine the balance of workload and manning in 
the F/A-18C community.  Data shows that current application of the Navy Standard at – 
sea workweek results in squadrons being overworked ashore during return and post-
deployment months.  This increase in workload is exacerbated by the fact that the Navy 
Standard at – sea Workweek does not include leave.  If all squadron maintenance 
personnel take their earned leave 3,930 days of labor predicted in the workweek must be 
performed by personnel not on leave. 
Data shows that squadron workload is not constant across the deployment cycle.  
Historical aircraft utilization rates suggest that projected utilization rates in the F/A-18C 
ROC/POE are accurate for their intended purpose.  This should not, however, eliminate 
the use of historical aircraft utilization data in the manpower process.  Squadrons could 
be more accurately manned at sea by using a percentage of projected aircraft utilization 
rates. 
Current alignment of workload and manning results in paying a premium for 
personnel deployed who do not support workload.  Establishment of an operational 
tempo department to more accurately align workload and manning through funding of 
requirements is one possible solution to balancing workload and manning while 
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 Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) determines aviation maintenance 
manpower requirements through systems analysis of historical workload, projected 
workload, and the application of staffing standards.  Resources used by NAVMAC 
include, but are not limited to; historical maintenance data, scheduled maintenance data, 
and aircraft utilization rates.  The goal of this research is to determine if current squadron 
manning properly reflects the weekly workload requirements of squadrons based on their 
operating environment when moving from shipboard to shore- based operations.  That is, 
to determine if people are where they will be most effectively utilized in order to meet 
Navy readiness and personnel management goals.  The following research questions were 
assembled to address this issue: 
• Does the Navy Standard at – sea Workweek (NSW) accurately reflect work 
accomplished by sea – deployable squadrons? 
• Is the assumption that workload is level across the deployment cycle accurate? 
• If workload is not level, can a structural realignment of sea and shore manpower 
requirements level workload while supporting Navy programs and initiatives 
such as retention, Sea Warrior, and Sea Swap? 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This research is limited to the F/A-18C community to control the scope of the 
project and to improve data collection accuracy.  The first research question addresses 
workweeks and their application to squadron workload.  In this area the NSW and its 
standard application to squadrons that operate at sea and ashore are discussed.  The 
second question examines historical workload data.  Unscheduled workload is based on 
historical data.  Unscheduled workload for 58 deployment cycles is analyzed for changes 
in workload during the deployment cycle.  The third question addresses historical 
workload but also includes a review of historical aircraft utilization rates.  Here projected 
wartime aircraft utilization rates are compared to aircraft utilization rates required to 
support operations ashore.  This comparison is used to determine if workload varies 
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between these periods.  If workload does vary can alignment of sea and shore manning 
alleviate uneven workload while supporting Navy initiatives such as Sea Warrior and Sea 
Swap?  Further, can the application of these initiatives support retention?  The question 
of supporting navy initiatives through alignment of manning also requires information 
about how squadrons operate while in homeport and at sea.  Squadron working hour data 
was collected through interviews of squadron personnel. 
Historical NAVMAC data for fiscal years 1988 through 2004 was used in the 
analysis.  Squadron unscheduled maintenance man hour data and deployment periods are 
placed into Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets.  To test the data a Generalized Linear Model 
(GLM) will be used (Cohen, Cohen, 1993).  The GLM will be used to test for differences 
in deployment cycle periods.  A pairwise comparison (Bonferroni Test) is also conducted 
to compare each deployment period to all other deployment periods.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This review examines previous studies of more accurately aligning workload and 
manning.  U.S. Navy leaders, officers, and sailors are all becoming increasingly aware of 
the need to properly align manning and other assets.  This review discusses the following:  
The terms and processes used to determine manpower requirements are reviewed and 
clarified; two major determinants for manpower requirements and their resulting products 
are described; and potential benefits of alignment actions are listed.  Among these 
benefits are several Navy initiatives, such as Sea Swap, personnel tempo, homesteading, 
and retention.  Also addressed are advantages of retaining corporate knowledge in the 
F/A-18C community.  These advantages include a more knowledgeable workforce, 
reduced maintenance induced malfunctions, and improved readiness and logistics.  
Finally, due to their impact on managing personnel and workload; personal leave, sea 
duty, and sea – duty counters are discussed. 
B. MANPOWER DETERMINANTS 
Two major determinants of manpower requirements in aviation maintenance are 
projected aircraft utilization rates and the productive work portion of the NSW.  Projected 
aircraft utilization is the total projected operating hours per aircraft per month in a 
wartime environment.  The productive portion of the NSW is the time sailors are 
responsible for performing maintenance tasks.  Aircraft utilization rates are listed in the 
F/A-18 Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operating Environment 
(ROC/POE) Statement, which along with the NSW is defined below.  The detailed 
process of naval aviation maintenance manpower requirements determination, and the 
subsequent funding and manning of requirements, is derived from a conglomerate of 
publications and instructions that are used in conjunction with aircraft utilization and 
workweek inputs to produce manpower requirements (CNO, 1998; CNAF, 2005; 
NAVMAC, 2000; NAVMAC, 2004; BUPERS, 2005).  The main goal of these 
instructions is to ensure that manpower requirements are accurately determined and that 
manning inventories are fairly distributed to meet wartime requirements. 
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1. ROC/POE 
The ROC/POE statement provides a list of capabilities and the operational 
environment in which these capabilities will be performed in wartime.  The ROC portion 
of the ROC/POE statement lists specific capabilities that units must be capable of 
performing in combat.  The POE portion of the statement lists the environment, such as, 
during aircraft carrier operations, in which ROC elements must be performed.  
Additionally, the POE lists the projected utilization rates of aircraft during wartime in 
terms of flight hours per month and average sortie length (CNO, 1998, Appendix B). 
2. The Navy Standard Workweek 
As a major determinant of manpower requirements the NSW has had its relevance 
questioned.  Total Force Programming Manpower and Information Management (N12) 
asked Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to assess the NSW “in response to the critique 
that the manpower determination process is flawed” (Moore, Griffis, Keenan, 2001, 18).  
In this study CNA found the average non-watch stander performed 69.5 hours of 
productive work per week.  However, CNA found no evidence that NSW is shaped by 
empirical studies.  CNA also states that “… until we have better evidence of what the 
workweek is revising the workweek based on data is risky.”  Also addressed by CNA was 
the currency of ROC/POEs stating only 26% were current. 
Although there are several versions of the NSW (a total of ten for military and 
civilians) of primary concern to this research are the shore-based squadrons and squadron 
personnel at sea workweeks.  The workweeks as listed in OPNAVINST 1000.16J 
appendix C are provided as Figures 1 and 2 on pages 5 and 6. 
This research concentrates specifically on the production portions of the NSW 
from which aviation maintenance manpower requirements are determined (CNO, 2002, 
C-4/5).  Shore based,  non-deployable squadrons operate on a 40 hour (33.38 production 
hours) workweek while, squadron personnel at sea operate on an 81 hour (70 production 
hours) workweek.  The general application of a single workweek to activities that move 
from ship to shore, such as aviation squadrons, can have negative impacts on morale and 
retention (Moore, Griffis, Keenan, 2001). 
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Commanding Officers are not constrained by the NSW and are allowed to manage 
personnel working hours to meet mission requirements (CNO, 2002, C-1).  However, 
CNO guidance acknowledges that routine extension of working hours can have negative 
impacts on morale and safety and should be avoided when possible (CNO, 2002, C-1).   
Potential costs of shortening the NSW are a potential roadblock to realignment of 
workload.  A shorter workweek means more requirements.  The productive workweek is 
a divisor in requirements determination, so the more people work, the less people you 
need.  In contrast, less time allotted for work requires more people.  The CNO extended 
the production portion of the Squadron Personnel at Sea Workweek from 67 hours to 70 
hours in June, 2002 (CNO, 2002).  Moore et al., (2002) also recognize the costs and 
benefits to sailors from changes to the workweek acknowledging savings for the Navy by 
increasing the workweek.  
 
Figure 1.   Shore-Based Squadrons Workweek (eg., HT, VT) Where Accompanying 
Dependents are Authorized 
Standard Workweek     40.00 hrs 
(Routine is 8 hours per day, 
5 days per week, excluding meal hours) 
Productive Workweek    33.38 hrs 
Analysis of Duty Hours 
 Total hours available weekly  40.00 
 Less non-available time: 
 Training  (1.47) 
 Service Diversion (1.00) 
 Leave   (2.62) 
 Holidays  (1.53) (6.62) 
Total hours available for 
productive work   (33.38) 
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Figure 2.   Squadron Personnel at Sea Workweek 
 
C. MANPOWER VS. MANNING 
In order to discuss realignment of manpower, the terms manpower, manpower 
requirements, and manning must be defined.  The term manpower is often used to reflect 
human resources or manning levels of naval units (House Testimony, 2004).  However, 
the term manpower does not appear, without a modifier, in the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) manpower requirements determination instruction (CNO, 2002, Appendix B).  
CNO’s instruction for determining manpower requirements describes requirements as 
virtual place holders in the manpower process, identifying quantitative and qualitative 
needs of units (CNO, 2002, B-15).  Manning is defined as “the specific inventory of 
personnel at an activity in terms of numbers, grades, and occupational groups” (CNO, 
2002, B-9).  NAVMAC’s definition of manning is synonymous with the CNOs.  As in 
the CNO’s instruction, NAVMAC does not list the term manpower without a modifier.  
NAVMAC does not list the term requirement individually either, instead, NAVMAC 
uses the term “manpower requirements” and defines the term for Navy as: 
The numbers of military and civilian manpower required for each activity, 
which have been approved for planning purposes by CNO, as 
representing: 
Standard Workweek     81.00 hrs 
(Routine is 8 hours per day, 
5 days per week, excluding meal hours) 
Productive Workweek    70.00 hrs 
Analysis of Duty Hours 
 Total hours available weekly  81.00 
 Less non-available time: 
 Training  (7.00) 
 Diversion  (4.00)  (11.00) 
Total hours available for 
productive work    70.00 
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(1) A need for manpower by quantities and skills, determined using 
industrial engineering and management analysis techniques. 
(2) A statement of quantity and quality of manpower needed to perform 
Required Operational Capabilities in a Projected Operating Environment 
(ROC/POE) (NAVMAC, 2000, Glossary). 
The Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) refers to manning as, “…the function 
of determining the quality, quantity, [ratings and numbers] and priority for assignment of 
personnel to all billets within a composite” (MILPERSMAN 1306-100, 3).  This term is 
more in alignment with a manpower requirement as defined by the two previous units.  
BUPERS’ term “manning control” more accurately reflects the definition of manning as 
defined by CNO and NAVMAC.  This research uses the terms manpower, requirements, 
and manning as defined by CNO and NAVMAC. 
D. MANPOWER DOCUMENTS 
1. Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) 
The SQMD is developed by NAVMAC and is the source document for the 
Activity Manpower Document (AMD).  The F/A-18C SQMD is a standardized document 
for F/A-18C squadrons1 listing quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements 
based on ROC/POE information (CNO, 1998, B-16).   
2. Activity Manpower Document (AMD) 
As described in the Manual of Total Force and Manpower Policies and 
Procedures (CNO, 2002, 6), “the AMD is the single authoritative source for an activity’s 
statement of manpower requirements … allocated to perform assigned missions”.  The 
AMD list 100 percent of personnel required for maintaining squadron aircraft, as well as 
support personnel.  Squadrons are rarely, if ever, manned at 100 percent due to 
constraints imposed by the manning process (BUPERS, 2002, 1306-100, 8-16).  Keep in 
mind, however, that squadrons rarely operate at 100 percent (W.M. Kelly, Personal 
Communication, June 13, 2005).  The AMD also identifies requirements that have been 
authorized (i.e., requirements to be manned).  The AMD for each activity may vary 
                                                 
1 There are currently two SQMDs for the F/A-18C.  The differences are based on the total of aircraft 
assigned.  There are currently 17 F/A-18C AMDs based on two SQMDs. 
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slightly as requirements are qualified for enlisted and officer community management 
goals.  These variations are not relevant in the total requirements determination.  An 
example of such a variation may be having an avionics master chief petty officer in one 
squadron and an airframes master chief petty officer in another.  Each of these master 
chiefs would be filling the generic requirement for a maintenance master chief petty 
officer. 
3. Navy Manning Plan (NMP) 
The NMP is used in determining fair share allocations of enlisted personnel.  That 
is to fairly distribute personnel assets (manning) that are in excess or shortage of 
manpower requirements.  The NMP fairly distributes personnel by quality and quantity.  
(CNO, 1997, C-3) (MILPERSMAN, 2002, 1306-100, 2).  
4. Enlisted Distribution Verification Report (EDVR) 
The EDVR is: 
A monthly statement of an activity’s enlisted personnel account.  It lists all 
individuals assigned and provides a summary by distribution community 
of the present and future manning status of the activity; a common 
reference for communicating manning status between an activity and its 
manning control authority (MCA); and a statement of account for 
verification by the activity.  (CNO, 1997, D-2) 
The separation of manpower and manning occurs between the AMD and EDVR.  
Figure 3 on page 9 shows this separation in a linear process from ROC/POE to EDVR. 
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Figure 3.   Manpower Documents Reflecting Manpower vs. Manning 
 
E. AWARENESS 
Accurately determining Navy manpower requirements is a key issue for the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) (Clark, 2004, p. 2; Fein, 2005; Scutro, 2005, p. 12).  
Potential fallout from failure to accurately identify manpower requirements and 
subsequently fill those requirements can threaten long term manning goals.  On the other 
hand, accurate determination and subsequent filling of requirements has great potential in 
leading to successfully meeting Navy personnel goals and polices such as personnel 
tempo, retention, and homesteading. 
In his research on Personnel Tempo and retention rates (Cooke, CNA, 1992) 
states “the most robust findings are that the percentage of time underway when not 
deployed and very long deployments are negatively associated with first-term retention.”  
An example of time underway when not deployed may be short periods at sea for training 
exercises.  Golding and Griffiis extend on previous CNA studies, examining the effects 
of heightened alert and wartime conditions on retention since the attacks of September 




















extended deployments were negatively affecting retention.  They do, however, state that 
retention problems may occur if frequent and extended deployments become the norm 
(Golding, Griffisd, 2002, 14). Golfin, Gasch, and Griffis (1996) explore the impacts of 
homesteading / home basing on retention, performance, and correcting the geographical 
imbalance of sea / shore rotations. 
Former CNO, Admiral Vern Clark, recognizing the far reaching effects of 
manning on other Navy policies, emphasized manpower issues as one of his top 5 
priorities for 2005 (Clark, 2004).  CNO, Admiral Michael Mullen, also acknowledges the 
importance of manpower and manning, listing manpower and personnel issues as one of 
three main challenges facing the Navy (Fein, 2005; Scutro, 2005, p12).  Vice Admiral 
Gerald L. Hoewing, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations Manpower and Personnel testified before the Military Personnel 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005 on FY-06 Defense 
Personnel Programs and stated “… the success of Navy’s vision for future combat 
effectiveness and employment is tied to our ability to properly shape the Force -- get all 
Navy members with the right skills to the right place at the right time” (Senate 
Testimony, 2005, 5). 
Members of the naval forces, at all levels, are developing and proposing methods 
for the redistribution of manpower and other assets to support making the Navy smaller, 
while still being effective in meeting mission requirements (Brennan, 1998; Culver, 
2002; Fleming, 1997).  Brennan suggests three options for the “United States Navy 
Helicopter force structure.”  One of these options is to realign the force along with 
mission under a Helicopter Air Wing Commander.  Culver suggests optimal distribution 
of pilots and MH-60S helicopters to reduce lost flying days.  Fleming discusses the cost 
and benefits of reduced manning with specific regard to “Smart Ship.”   CNP validated 
the need for a smaller force when testifying before the House Armed Services Committee 
Subcommittee on Total Force, he stated that “the Navy has, in its current inventory, more 
people than needed to meet mission tasking” (House Testimony, 2004).  
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F. ALIGNMENT 
1. Sea Operational Detachments (SEAOPDETS) 
Recognizing the potential for aligning workload with manning is not a new 
concept.  SEAOPDETS were created to eliminate excess manpower requirements created 
from rounding.  When current SEAOPDET workload was performed by individual 
squadron’s requirements would increase from rounding.  This is due to deployable 
squadrons being attached to carrier air wings and deploying as an aggregated unit.  There 
are generally three F/A-18C squadrons in an air wing.  If a squadron required .03 
personnel for I-Level support during deployment each squadron would have to be 
assigned 1 requirement overstating the requirement by 2 (W.M. Kelly, Personal 
Correspondence, August 9, 2005).  The creation of SEAOPDETS eliminated this 
overstatement of requirements by combing the .03 workload for each squadron into a 
single requirement.  SEOPDETS now consist of personnel trained in aircraft intermediate 
level maintenance that are assigned to Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department 
(AIMD) and follow the workload from shore installations to aircraft carriers when 
squadrons embark (CNAF, 2005, 3-2).  This philosophy has now carried over to shore 
establishments.  AIMDs ashore are now referred to as Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance 
Detachments and have been realigned to fall under Type Wing Commanders (Nieto, 
2005, 1).  SEAOPDET personnel work a 40 (33.38 production) hour week ashore and an 
81 (70 production) hour week at sea.  This is possible because personnel assigned to 
SEAOPDETS augment the manning and workload of either the sea or shore AIMD 
depending on the location of the squadrons they support.  SEAOPDETs manpower 
requirements are based on the at-sea workweek. 
2 F/A-18C Utilization 
An accurate understanding of alignment of personnel and workload requires a 
brief discussion of aircraft utilization.  Aircraft utilization rates in the POE reflect 
projected wartime utilization.  During peace operations aircraft utilization rates can be 
predicted from training requirements.  Training and readiness requirements are delineated 
by Commander Naval Air Force (CNAF) in COMNAVAIRFORINST 3500.1B.  In this 
instruction CNAF lists minimum flight hours per pilot, per month to maintain readiness 
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levels.  Readiness levels for squadrons are reported via “M-ratings.”  M-ratings “reflect 
the level of training completed by the squadron” (CNAF, n.d., Encl 4, 6).  “CNO requires 
squadrons to be M-2 by the beginning of their employability period” (CNAF, n.d., Encl 
4, 7).  The impact of M-2 in determining manpower requirements is discussed in the 
analysis section.  To this point projected aircraft utilization and training aircraft 
utilization requirements have been outlined.  Next, historical aircraft utilization rates and 
their relation to determining manpower requirements are discussed.  
F/A-18C squadrons have met or exceeded monthly projected flight hours from the 
ROC/POE 42 times in the last 17 years (W.M. Kelly, Personal Correspondence, June 13, 
2005).  Each of these occurrences can be matched to a major campaign such as Desert 
Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.  During these campaigns squadrons 
exceeded POE flight hours only 7 times for two or more consecutive months (6 for two 
consecutive months and 1 for 3 consecutive months).  In only 1 out of the 7 times that 
POE hours were exceeded for consecutive months did a squadron stay within the 
projected sortie length.  In the other 6 instances exceeding POE hours can be contributed 
to extended sortie lengths. 
The significance of the increased sortie length goes back to aircraft utilization 
rates.  If aircraft are being flown more hours per sortie than projected, sorties are 
occurring at a less frequent rate and aircraft turnaround maintenance is performed less 
frequently.  Scheduled maintenance, however, occurs more frequently.  Interestingly, 
maintenance man hour per flight hour ratios during these brief periods decreased instead 
of increased.  This is the result of the extended sortie length during combat operations 
(Chandler, 2002).  This effect on maintenance man hour per flight hour is due to non-
abort discrepancies, for example, if a light bulb burns out at the beginning of a sortie the 
sortie is still completed but the number of flight hours flown in relation to hours worked 
is greater than if aircraft were operating at projected sortie rates. 
Aircraft require maintenance based on intervals of both calendar days and flight 
hours (CNAF, 2005, 12-6).  This requirement combined with increased utilization would 
tend to support increasing manning during these periods.  However, aircraft that are 
flying cannot be worked on and for this reason increased manning does not necessarily 
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solve the problem.  A possible solution is to rotate aircraft to increase flight hours, which 
was recommend for the H-46 (Culver, 2002).   
G. SUPPORTING NAVY INITIATIVES 
The U.S. Navy continues to research initiatives that will allow the service to meet 
their primary mission while simultaneously retaining the personnel needed to operate an 
all volunteer force (Cooke et al., 1992; Golding, 2004; Golfin et al., 1996; Moore, 2001).  
Of these initiatives those that are related to this research are: Sea Warrior, Sea Swap, 
homesteading, maintaining personal tempo of operations (PERSTEMPO), and retention.  
Properly aligning manning with workload can affect each of these initiatives. 
1. Sea Warrior  
Sea Warrior is the vision of having the right people in the right place at the right 
time.  This work looks into whether the right place and the right time is at sea. 
2. Sea Swap 
Sea Swap allows ships to remain deployed on station longer by limiting transit 
time, to and from operational areas.  Swapping crews at 6 month intervals allows the 
Navy to keep ships on station longer without violating PERSTEMPO (Senate Testimony, 
2002).  Sea Swap has been considered successful by some (Dickson, 2004), and a failure 
by others (Schonauer, 2004).  Regardless of these evaluations of effectiveness, Sea Swap 
supports the trend of moving personnel to the work.  In the case of Sea Swap, the work is 
aboard ship. 
3. Homesteading  
Homesteading has been researched since 1996.  Possible benefits of homesteading 
are increased retention and reduced permanent change of station cost.  An identified 
problem with homesteading is a mismatch of sea and shore billets (Quester et al., 1996, 
39).  Quester, et al., (1996, 39) noted that the establishment of shore billets will reduce 
the need to incorporate other recommendations from the study such as increasing sea 
billets. 
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4. Personnel Tempo 
Guidance for PERSTEMPO is outlined in OPNAVINST 3000.13B.   This 
instruction sets guidance on PERSTEMPO to ensure continual monitoring of this quality 
of life issue.  Specifically, “the program and its goals are the culmination of a deliberate 
process to balance support of national objectives with reasonable operating conditions for 
our naval personnel, and maintain the professionalism associated with going to sea while 
providing a reasonable home life” (CNO, 2000, 1). 
5. Retention  
Time away while not deployed and PERSTEMPO are primary reasons listed by 
sailors for separation (Cooke, 1992).  Reluctance to relocate due to personnel reasons is 
another reason sailors list for separation (Quester et al., 1996).  By identifying when and 
where sailors are most needed the Navy may be able to eliminate variances in working 
hours and duty assignments from sailor’s lives. 
H. F/A-18C COMMUNITY ADVANTAGES 
Possible advantages of aligning workload and manning which may be gained by 
the F/A-18C community include:  retaining corporate knowledge, reducing training cost 
through reduction of learning, and increased readiness through the retention of quality 
personnel and reduction of maintenance induced errors.  These advantages are either 
directly or indirectly related to the benefits of supporting Navy initiatives as described 
above. 
1. Retaining Corporate Knowledge and Reducing Training Cost  
As Brooking (1999, p34) observes: “Human centered assets comprise the 
collective expertise, creative and problem solving capability, leadership, entrepreneurial 
and managerial skills embodied by the employees of the organization.”  The effects of 
personnel turnover are not limited to one or two individuals but can affect the entire 
organization.  March (1999, p124) states: “Since there is a positive relation between 
length of service in the organization and individual knowledge, the greater the turnover, 
the shorter the average length of service and the lower the average individual knowledge 
at any point.”  Retaining corporate memory requires retaining individuals. 
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Retaining corporate knowledge can also reduce training costs.  To highlight this 
point the cost to get an Avionics Electronics Technician to their first squadron is 
estimated to be $60,987.60 ($14,206.00 Recruiting, $11,461.60 Basic Training, $ 
4,698.00 Avionics Class “A” School, $30,622.00 F/A-18C Training at CNATTU).2  Each 
time a sailor separates (regardless of rank or rate) the recruiting and Basic Training cost 
must be paid for their replacement.  
2. Increased Readiness 
Increased readiness is in part a byproduct of retaining corporate knowledge.  By 
retaining corporate knowledge maintenance errors are reduced, system problems are 
analyzed faster, and scheduled maintenance can, potentially, be performed more 
efficiently.  The end result is improved aircraft readiness (i.e., more full mission capable 
aircraft on the flight line).  
I. PERSONAL LEAVE, SEA PAY, AND SEA - DUTY COUNTERS 
A thorough analysis of the at-sea workweek requires a brief look into the policies 
of leave, sea pay, and sea - duty counters.  These policies introduce increased work, 
increased management of personnel, and conflict between types of sea duty. 
1. Personal Leave 
Personal leave time is not considered in the at-sea NSW.  The shore workweek 
allows 2.62 hours of leave per person per week.  Assuming a squadron is manned at 
100% of requirements and each of the 131 maintenance personnel in a 10 plane F/A-18C 
squadron takes their earned 30 days leave, 3,930 workdays must be performed by 
personnel not on leave.  This point is highlighted when personnel preparing for or 
returning from deployment are required to work long hours to support pre and post - 
cruise leave periods.  The Navy does make considerations for personnel that are not 
allowed to take leave.  BUPERS (2002, Article 1050-070) states that personnel may 
accrue up to 90 days leave under specified circumstances.  The accrual of such large 
                                                 
2 Recruiting and Basic Training cost obtained from www.dod.mil/comptroller/par/fy2004/06-
01_detailed _performance.pdf Retrieved Oct 3, 2005.  Avionics Class “A” School cost obtained from Naval 
Aviation Technical Training Center (NATTC) Pensacola (Anderson, R.L. Personal Correspondence, Oct 4, 
2005).  Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training Unit (CNATTU) cost obtained from (Martin, M.J. 
(Personal Correspondence, Oct 4, 2005). 
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amounts of leave results in two problems.  First, allowing a member to take accrued leave 
in excess of their 30 days earned strains personnel management.  Second, accruing this 
leave is contradictory to MILPERSMAN 1050-30 which outlines the benefits of an 
aggressive leave program.  This article further identifies (subparagraph 10b) 
“Circumstances for Special Emphasis to Grant Leave.”  In this section protracted periods 
of deployment is listed as a circumstance to be considered. 
2. Sea Duty 
Personnel on sea duty receive sea pay as compensation for the recognized 
hardships of long working hours endured during sea-duty assignments (Golding and 
McArver, 2001).  Squadron personnel receive sea pay while onboard ship but do not 
receive sea pay while at their home stations.  Assuming that sea pay is for being on sea 
duty and not necessarily for being onboard ship should squadron personnel receive sea 
pay for their entire “sea-duty assignment?”  Simple application of the NSW would imply 
that the answer to this question is yes.  The true question, however, is; are squadron 
personnel actually working sea duty hours ashore?  If so, is there a way to manage the 
workload imposed on individual sailors to make the workweek applicable by squadron 
location (ashore or afloat)? 
3. Sea Counters 
Squadron personnel sea counters do not run while ashore.  Again, assuming sea 
duty is sea duty and the NSW is applied to both shipboard and squadron personnel, why 
do some sea counters run while others are stopped?  Although this subject is beyond the 
scope of this research allowing sea counters to run for squadron personnel may be a small 
way of increasing morale and making sea duty more attractive. 
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III. DETERMINING MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
A. POLICY 
CNO defines manpower requirement determination as “Total Force Manpower 
Requirements Determination. Total force includes peacetime and wartime, active and 
reserve military, civilians, and contractors” (CNO, 2002).  The CNO further states 
“Aviation Manpower requirements shall be based on directed mission, functions, and 
tasks (MFTs) and/or required operational capability/projected operational environment 
(ROC/POE) and reflected on the Activity Manpower Document (AMD).  Workload shall 
be determined using industrial engineering or other justifiable techniques, which yield 
accurate manpower requirements” (CNO, 2002). 
B. THE PROCESS 
1. Maintenance Manpower Requirements Determination 
The following paragraphs briefly describe the aviation maintenance manpower 
requirements process.  These paragraphs are provided to give the reader a general 
understanding of the process.  The actual process is more involved and requires detailed 
analysis to accurately determine manpower requirements.3 
The aviation manpower requirements process is a bottom up process.  It begins 
with the calculation of maintenance production work centers’ requirements.  Then, 
overhead requirements are calculated.  The last step is to determine support personnel 
requirements. 
All maintenance production work centers’ requirements are determined by 
summing the man-hours forecasted for corrective maintenance (CM), preventive 
maintenance (PM), support action maintenance (SA), facilities maintenance (FM), utility 
tasking (UT), and administrative support (AS).  This sum is divided by the productive 
workweek.  The resulting answer (whole number and decimal fraction) is converted to a 
requirement through the application of a rounding rule. 
                                                 
3 The requirements process description was compiled from Corrective Maintenance Report F/A-18C, 
Kelly, 2005. 
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CM consists of work accomplished on an unscheduled basis, plus work 
accomplished during the fix phase of a preventative maintenance scheduled inspection, 
plus work accomplished as a result of an event (e.g. hard landing, round of ammunition 
fire, etc.) plus Technical Directive compliance.  The Naval Aviation Logistics Data 
Analysis (NALDA) compiles maintenance data.  NALDA distributes a summary of 
appropriate data for each type/model/series (T/M/S) of aircraft.  From this data a T/M/S 
data set is constructed.  Regression analysis is applied to T/M/S data set to develop a 
T/M/S predictor equation. 
The other component of corrective maintenance is the T/M/S Technical Directive 
(TD). The Naval Air System Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) issues a TD to modify or 
accomplish a one-time inspection of naval aircraft and associated equipment.  Because 
TDs are Bureau (i.e., aircraft identification) Number specific, a T/M/S TD man-hour per 
aircraft factor is developed by dividing the average monthly TD coded man-hours by the 
average monthly number of aircraft. 
Preventive maintenance consists of the preparatory time, plus the travel time to 
and from the aircraft, plus the time to accomplish the scheduled maintenance plus the 
time for clean up.   NAVMAC uses the times provided by NAVAIRSYSCOM and 
aircraft manufacturers for scheduled maintenance requirement cards (MRC).  Scheduled 
maintenance includes maintenance that is driven by flight hour or calendar days.  For 
example, each aircraft must be washed every 14 days (Calendar Inspection).  Gearboxes 
are checked by examining magnetic chip detectors every 30 flight hours (Flight Hour 
Driven Inspection).  The times on MRCs are broken down by inspection time and rating 




Figure 4.   Maintenance Requirement Card 
 
The time requirements for tasks listed on MRCs do not include the time for 
traveling or gathering tools and materials required to perform the task (MIL-M-2361G 
(AS), 1987, 10).  For this reason NAVMAC developed a Make Ready / Put Away 
(MR/PA) standard to account for this work.  The MRPA Standard adds 17% to the 
scheduled maintenance time. 
At one time support action times were collected using the Navy’s standard action 
form (SAF) card for repetitive tasks such as aircraft turnaround inspections and servicing 
operations.  When the CNO eliminated the use of SAF cards NAVMAC developed a set 
of support action standards for forecasting this work.  The application of the 
appropriation support action standard yields the forecasted time. 
Facilities maintenance consists of routine housekeeping of assigned working and 
operating spaces.  A NAVMAC standard quantifies the time for facilities maintenance for 
shore based deployable and carrier deployable squadrons. 
Utility tasking is time expended performing miscellaneous work which does not 
apply to other categories, but which is essential to the operation of a squadron.  Utility 
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tasking is accomplished by working parties that augment ship’s personnel. A NAVMAC 
standard quantifies the time for utility tasking. 
Administrative support comprises work actions associated with the preparation 
and execution of plans required for the internal functioning of the command and 
management of assigned personnel.  Administrative support includes tasks such as 
supervision, attending meetings, giving and receiving training, obtaining office supplies.   
A NAVMAC standard quantifies the time for administrative support. 
Application of the POE number of aircraft, utilization rate, and sortie length to 
T/M/S predictor equation, T/M/S TD man-hour per aircraft factor, times on MRCs and 
standards yields the production work center’s manpower.  Currently the 10 plane F/A-
18C SQMD has 131 production work center requirements. It is important to note here 
that this answer is only the production portion of squadron requirements and does not 
take into consideration overhead and support personnel. 
2. Overhead and Support Personnel 
Total squadron manpower requirements include overhead and support 
requirements in addition to production (i.e., workload driven) requirements.  Examples of 
directed requirements include; Command Master Chief (CNO, Dec 2000, Encl 1, 2) and 
Safety Petty Officer (CNO, 2001, Encl 1, 20).  Other personnel such as Yeomen and 
Personnelmen are determined by staffing standards.  Staffing standards are based on the 
amount of work done by these ratings and is collected by NAVMAC analyst (NAVMAC, 
2000). 
Also included in support personnel category are integrated services.  These 
personnel support production, directed, and population driven requirements.  Integrated 
services personnel perform duties such as, laundryman, food service attendants, 
disbursing clerks, and supply personnel among others.  These personnel “integrate” with 
departments onboard an aircraft carrier to supplement the ships food, laundry, and other 
services. 
Other overhead and support roles include quality assurance (QA) personnel, the 
maintenance control division, and maintenance administration.  QA personnel perform 
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safe for flight inspections, monitor command programs such as hydraulic contamination 
and tool control as well as, develop and administer test for personnel in production work 
centers performing QA functions.  Maintenance Control personnel supervise and 
coordinate maintenance, ensure aircraft are safe for flight, and coordinate the 
maintenance actions of production work centers in support of flight requirements.  Of the 
current 214 enlisted requirements for a10 plane F/A-18 squadron, 83 are overhead and 
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IV. ALIGNMENT OF MANNING 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
 Based on 11 years of close observation while assigned to three F/A-18 squadrons 
and a tour of duty at NAVMAC, it is my observation that squadron workload varies while 
squadron fair share manning is constant.  This observation suggests that squadron 
manning and workload are frequently not aligned just before and after deployment (see 
Figure 5, page 24).  The misalignment between workload and manning is a result of the 
building up and tearing down of aircraft, required just before and after deployment, to 
ensure squadrons deploy with their full allotment of aircraft. 
To determine if others shared the view of fluctuating workload, interviews were 
conducted among squadron and wing personnel at Naval Air Station Lemoore, Ca.  
Personnel interviewed included the type wing maintenance officer, type wing 
maintenance master chief petty officer, squadron commanding officers, maintenance 
officers, and maintenance master chief petty officers.  During interviews 7 out of 12 
personnel interviewed said that it was necessary to build aircraft prior to deployment with 
5 of those 7 stating this resulted in increased working hours.  Only 3 of 12 stated it was 
necessary to tear down aircraft after deployment.  There was, however, concern about the 
increasing number of aircraft transfers and the impact that transfer and acceptance 
inspections are having on unscheduled workload.  This concern was expressed by 
Commanding Officer of VFA-147 whose squadron experienced 24 aircraft transfers 
during the last deployment cycle.  The Commanding Officer of VFA-25 also mentioned 
the increasing number of aircraft transfers.  The type wing maintenance master chief 
highlighted the fact that workload generally increases prior to deployment due to required 
maintenance.  Compass swings, electronic counter measure system sweeps, and landing 
gear strut servicing were provided examples. 
 24
 
Figure 5.   Manning vs. Workload 
 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Workload, Deployment Cycles, and Flight Hours 
To determine if the NSW is accurately applied to sea-deployable squadrons the 
workload experienced by squadrons must first be determined.  In order to answer this 
question it was first necessary to analyze data based on the second research question.  Is 
the assumption that workload is level across the deployment cycle accurate?  To 
determine if workload is constant across deployment cycles 17 years of historical flight 
and workload data for F/A-18C squadrons was reviewed.  This historical data was then 
aligned with deployment cycles.  The specific points in the deployment cycles that were 
analyzed were defined as: pre deployment (2 months prior to deployment month), 
departure month, cruise months, return month, post deployment (2 months following 
return), and home months.  Utilizing online resources to gather deployment information 
58 deployment dates for 12 different squadrons were found.  These squadrons and 
deployment cycles represent the sample data used in the evaluation of unscheduled 






Table 1.   Squadrons and Cruise Periods used in Research 
 
 
As previously discussed unscheduled maintenance man hour per flight hour data 
is a key element of the manpower requirements determination process.  Unscheduled 
maintenance is the element in NAVMAC’s data that is reported by squadrons and used in 
the SQMD process (Kelly, 2005).  That is, scheduled maintenance can be predicted by 
using times on MRCs and deriving the occurrence of scheduled maintenance based on 
projected utilization.  Unscheduled maintenance is not so easily predicted and is based on 
historical data reported by squadrons.  Unscheduled man hour per flight hour data was 
averaged over deployment cycles and then each month (labeled pre, post, etc.) was 
divided by the average to normalize the deployment cycle data by squadron and 
individual deployments.  After each deployment cycle was normalized the selected 
periods were averaged and these resulting averages reflect the changes in workload 
experienced across the deployment cycle.    This process was repeated for selected 
squadrons and then aggregated to reflect community results. Raw data is displayed in 
Figures 6 and 7 on page 26. 
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Figure 6.   Average Raw Historical Unscheduled Man Hours Squadron 
 
































Figure 7.   Average Raw Historical Unscheduled Man Hours Community 
 
When reviewing historical data it was noted that entire months (in some cases, 
consecutive months) of data were represented by zeros; those months were eliminated 
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from the initial averaging process.  There were also very high months of man hour per 
flight hour data.  This posed a problem in skewing the data in the periods where the high 
hours occurred.  To correct for skewing the standard deviation of unscheduled man hours 
per flight hour by evaluated period was taken.  Periods where man hours were three 
standard deviations higher than the mean were eliminated from the data set.  This 
eliminated only 17 months from the 58 deployment cycles evaluated, other periods not 
available as shown in Table 2 is due to information not being available.  After periods 
with no data or high data (more than three standard deviations above the mean) were 
removed the remaining periods proved statistically sound for analysis.  Assuming a 24 
month deployment cycle and a six month deployment, the number of available 
observations is compared to possible observations for each period in the cycle.  Table 2 
shows these results.  The results of squadron and F/A-18C community unscheduled 
workload after smoothing are presented in Figures 8 and 9 on page 28. 







Percentage of Possible 
Observations Captured 
Pre 102 116 88% 
Depart 47 58 81% 
Cruise 258 348 74% 
Return 45 58 78% 
Post 100 116 86% 
Home 579 696 83% 
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Figure 8.   Average Historical Man Hours by Squadron (Smoothed) 
 































Figure 9.   Average Historical Man Hours for F/A-18C Community (Smoothed) 
 
Flight hour data was reviewed to gain a historical perspective about aircraft 
utilization.  As a key input into the manpower requirements determination process 
historical, rather than projected, aircraft utilization rates may provide more accurate 
indications of when and where maintenance manning is most needed.  Average aircraft 
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utilization was determined by taking reported monthly aircraft utilization rates of 
squadrons and averaging the rates by fiscal year.  The fiscal year averages were then 
averaged for the 17 year period, the average monthly utilization across all periods is 
33.19.  Average monthly aircraft utilization rates for fiscal years 1988 through 2004 are 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.   Historical Aircraft Utilization 1988-2004 
 
Two periods were selected for further evaluation of the at sea and ashore aircraft 
utilization rates.  These periods are FY 1995 – 1996 and FY 2001- 2003.  The average at 
sea utilization for both periods is 41.4, while the average at home utilization is 31.4 and 
26.2 respectively (Kelly, Personal Correspondence, June 13, 2005).  The purpose of the 
above chart and the two additional periods evaluated is to show that aircraft utilization is 
relatively constant and can be predicted using historical data eliminating the need for, or 
at minimum improving, utilization projections.  
2. Training Requirements and Aircraft Utilization Ashore 
CNAF Instruction 3500.1B, enclosure 5 lists the minimum number of flight hours 
and sorties (based on a one and one half hour sortie length) that each pilot in a squadron 
must fly to maintain directed readiness levels.  By multiplying the number of pilots in a 
squadron by the required flight hours in CNAF instruction, and then dividing by the total 
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number of aircraft assigned, required utilization rates ashore can be determined.  Table 3 
lists flight hour requirements, utilization rates, and maintenance personnel requirements 
(for shore duty workweek) to support M-2 and M-1 training utilization rates ashore.  M-2 
was chosen as the level of readiness to maintain because this is the level delineated by 
CNO for squadron employment. M-1 requirements are listed for comparison.  
Maintenance personnel required to support M-2 and M-1 readiness levels were derived at 
NAVMAC based on required aircraft utilization.  M-1 numbers reflect concerns 
expressed by Commander Tom Crain, NAVMAC’s Aviation Requirements Department 
Head and also by squadron personnel.  The concern of maintaining ordnance load team 
integrity in the avionics and ordnance work centers was addressed by holding the number 
of personnel in these work centers constant for sea and shore duty workweeks. 
 














M-2 18.9 30.2 143 131 
M-1 23.0 36.8 144* 131 
*This number reflects adjustments made in the Avionics, Ordnance, and Line work 
centers.  Requirements in the Avionics and Ordnance are held constant to maintain load 
and release check team integrity.  Line work center is held constant at one plane captain 
per shift per aircraft. 
 
3. Manning at 80 Percent of POE Hours 
Historical data shows that squadrons do not consistently operate at 100 percent of 
projected aircraft utilization rates.  Based on this information during the NAVMAC visit 
it was requested that NAVMAC determine maintenance manpower requirements based 
on 80 percent of projected aircraft utilization. 
To operate at sea, at 80 percent of current POE hours an F/A-18C squadron 
requires 128 maintenance personnel, a reduction of 3 personnel from present 
requirements (see Table 4, page 31).  M-2 levels are taken from CNAFINST 3500.1B and 
80 percent ROC/POE requirements were obtained from NAVMAC. 
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M-2 18.9 30.2 143 131 
80 Percent POE * * 128** 131 
* Aircraft utilization data from the POE is classified.  ** Indicates number of 
requirements holding Avionics, Ordnance, and Line work centers constant. 
 
4. Aircraft Maintenance and Squadron Working Hours 
Interviews with squadron personnel at Naval Air Station, Lemoore indicate that 
the management of aircraft and spare parts has improved greatly and the build up and tear 
down of aircraft prior to and after deployment does not create a significant increase in 
workload.  The fluctuations observed in workload data may be due to aging aircraft.  
Despite improvements in the wing’s management of assets  aircraft are approaching life 
limits for carrier operations, which, according to squadron and wing personnel, is 
resulting in an increasing number of aircraft transfer and acceptance inspections.  
Increased inspections are necessary to get non-life limited aircraft to squadrons going to 
sea, while keeping those aircraft approaching life limits ashore. 
Personal interviews also revealed that squadrons are not consistently working sea 
– duty hours while ashore.  At times squadrons are required to work weekends and extra 
hours preparing for and after returning from deployments.  Squadrons ashore are working 
on average 9 hour days, 5 days per week.4  Add to this time the fact that shipboard 
services are not available and the shore – duty workweek of 40 total hours is easily 
exceeded.  Several squadrons require their corrosion control personnel to work weekends.  
It is environmental reasons and not workload that makes this weekend work necessary. 
5. Data Set Testing and Results 
A GLM was used to test for differences in unscheduled hours between 
deployment periods controlling for squadrons, and across years.  The overall model 
                                                 
4 Average working hours determined through interviews of squadron personnel in VFA-25, VFA-113, 
VFA-146, and VFA-147. 
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shows a significant fit (F = 23.176, P<.000, R2 = .126), and differences between periods 
were significant as well (F = 4.011, P<.001, R2 = .018).  This may be due to a small 
number of squadron’s unscheduled maintenance hours having a different pattern than 
others.   
A Bonferroni test was conducted for pairwise comparison between deployment 
periods.  Results of this test show significant differences between the return period and 
the pre, cruise, and home periods.  No significant differences are noted between the 
return period and the departure and post periods.  These results provide additional support 
for the need for augmentation of manning during return and post periods. 
 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusions 
• Navy Standard at – sea Workweek does not accurately reflect sea-deployable 
squadron workload 
Current application of the NSW for squadron personnel at sea does not meet the 
criteria listed in the two workweeks previously described.  Manpower requirements for 
squadrons that deploy are determined using the squadron personnel at – sea workweek.  
However, when these personnel are ashore, accompanied by their authorized dependents, 
and taking earned leave the shore based squadron workweek is not applied. 
The NSW implies 70 hours of productive work will be performed per sailor per 
week while at sea and while ashore.  Squadron personnel working 70 hours per week 
ashore without the immediate locality and support provided onboard ship experience 
even longer days.  Transit times, food purchases, and meal preparation are just some 
examples of additive time experienced ashore.  Although shore based operations do not 
always require this much work there are times when sea – deployable squadron sailors 
performing work ashore are required to work more than their shore based counterparts. 
• Workload is not level across the deployment cycle 
The data strongly supports the hypothesis that workload experienced by squadron 
maintenance personnel is not constant with return and post deployment workload being 
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dramatically higher than other periods. Moderate increases are also noticed in the pre - 
deployment period, refer to Figure 9.  This increased workload is experienced during 
times when squadron personnel are taking leave in preparation for, or after returning from 
deployment (i.e., POM Period).  The fact that fewer personnel are accomplishing this 
greater workload means even longer hours while ashore. 
• A structural realignment of sea and shore manpower requirements could level 
workload while supporting Navy programs and initiatives such as retention, Sea 
Warrior, and Sea Swap 
Studies and research discussed in the literature review suggest that structural 
realignment can contribute to meeting Navy goals.  Allowing personnel to rotate to shore 
duty in the same geographical location as sea duty will eliminate one of the reasons 
sailors separate (Cooke, 1992).  Increased retention means retaining corporate knowledge 
and increases the pool of talented sailors to support Sea Swap.  
2. Recommendations 
• Continue current application of NSW and control manning through funding of 
requirements   
Although current application of the NSW is not perfect it appears to be accurate in 
meeting the intended purpose of determining wartime requirements based on projected 
aircraft utilization.  Interviews of squadron personnel indicate that sailors are not 
typically working at – sea hours while ashore but do experience spikes in workload.  The 
alleviation of increased working hours during periods of increased work is addressed 
below.   
• Establish shore – duty billets to off set spikes in squadron workload  
A practical alternative to eliminating the impact of peaks in workload on sailors is 
to augment squadrons at shore and at sea with qualified shore personnel when required.  
This concept is in general alignment with the CNO’s strategy of “Sea Swap” (Senate 
Testimony, 2002) and would only be used at sea when necessary.  This concept also 
supports the manpower planning system in having shore requirements support operational 
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forces (CNAF, 2005, 2-5).  The result is more accurate alignment of manning with 
workload. 
The number of squadron personnel being deployed should be reduced to support a 
percentage of projected wartime utilization.  Personnel not deploying will be assigned to 
type wings for shore duty in an operational tempo department (OPTEMPODEPT).  These 
shore-duty billets will be wing controlled and personnel filling these billets will be fully 
qualified for their rate and rank.  These highly qualified personnel will be used to 
augment squadrons during periods of peak workload such as that experienced prior to and 
just after deployment.  Personnel filling these billets must also be informed that the 
possibility of deployment exists if deployed squadrons encounter an unexpected increase 
in workload.  
Aligning manpower requirements, manning, and workload will require no 
changes in the manpower requirements determination process and can be performed 
through the funding of requirements (i.e., billets authorized).  This means continuing to 
determine wartime requirements based on POE hours.  This is not only acceptable but 
desirable considering that 42 times, squadrons have been required to operate at this level.  
NAVMAC would continue to develop the SQMD based on POE utilization rates and 
AMDs would continue to list wartime requirements.  However, the EDVR would reflect 
less billets authorized (3 less in the 80% example) in deployable squadrons, while 
increasing the number of shore requirements on each coast by 45.  This action supports 
historical workload.  The 45 shore requirements are the exact number required to off set 
the workload between the shore and at – sea workweeks during peak periods assuming 
three F/A-18C squadrons per air wing.  The required number of shore personnel was 
totally linear and is not based on measured workload.  Measuring the workload of the 
OPTEMPODEPT may result in fewer requirements. 
With 15 F/A-18C squadrons5 45 OPTEMPODEPT requirements can be funded 
simply by moving the funding authorization for these billets from the squadron to the 
                                                 
5 There are actually 18 F/A-18C squadrons.  VFA-97 is functioning under the Unit Deployment 
Program and has manpower requirements that differ from the typical F/A-18C squadron.  VFA-192 and 
VFA-195 are forward deployed and would not reap the benefits of augmentation. 
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OPTEMPODEPT.  The remaining 45 billets would be funded on the basis of supporting 
Navy initiatives such as Sea Swap, Sea Warrior, and Homesteading.  These billets will 
also help to ease the increasing imbalance between sea and shore billets.  By providing 
shore duty for the most talented sailors the Navy has a better chance of retaining them.  
Shore billets will also allow sailors the opportunity to maintain their skills by working in 
their ratings during shore assignment.  Additional savings may also be realized in reduced 
permanent change of station moves and training costs.  An added benefit of retaining 
quality sailors may be realized by reducing the numbers of maintenance induced failures 
and increased readiness as discrepancies are repaired faster. 
Determining the ranks and ratings of personnel required in the OPTEMPODEPT 
falls back to NAVMAC.  NAVMAC would need to develop a SQMD (or shore 
equivalent) for this specific purpose.  OPTEMPODET personnel should have support 
requirements fulfilled through the F/A-18C Fleet Replacement Squadron, or the host 
station, whichever can absorb these individuals without significant increases in support 
personnel requirements. 
• Alignment of workload and manning might better facilitate support of recent 
Navy initiatives such as retention, Sea Warrior, and Sea Swap 
The above recommendations discuss how the alignment of workload and manning 
can help support Navy initiatives.  By providing shore options for our most talented 
sailors the Navy can support these programs and initiatives.  Further, by ensuring that 
shore duty billets are matched with the skills of sailors rating knowledge and proficiency 
can be maintained.  The end result is highly trained sailors choosing to stay Navy because 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
• Would this methodology apply to other aviation communities? 
All sea-deployable squadron’s manpower requirements are determined using the 
same basic processes.  If the processes are the same are potential benefits the same. 
• Are peaks in squadron maintenance man hour to flight hour due to increased 
workload, or are increases due to aircraft availability and limited flying? 
Data from this research indicates that squadron workload increases significantly 
during return and post – deployment months.  Is this increase in maintenance man hour 
per flight hour due to increased work that occurs naturally after deployment or is this 
opportunistic work performed when aircraft are flying less?  Also to be addressed.  Is this 
workload directly related to the increased number of aircraft transfer and acceptance 
inspections reported by squadron personnel as necessary to keep life – limited aircraft 
ashore? 
• Can integrated services and overhead and support personnel be aggregated and 
managed at the Carrier Air Wing level to reduce the numbers for these 
requirements? 
The functions of support personnel are very generic.  The maintenance of service 
records and generating correspondence are just two examples of areas that might be 
considered for integration.  Some support functions already have this type of integration.  
Squadron Disbursing Clerks and Hospital Corpsman integrate with the ships disbursing 
and medical departments when squadrons embark. 
• Examine the feasibility of increasing F/A-18C squadrons from 10 to 20 planes to 
offset overhead and support requirements? 
As mentioned in this research 83 of the 214 enlisted personnel in a ten plane F/A-
18C squadron are supervisory and support personnel.  Combining squadrons would 
eliminate some of these overhead requirements.  One Command Master Chief and one 
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